# The effects of housing transaction taxes on purchases, mobility and prices

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# For homeowners, stamp duty is a tax on mobility. Its burden is growing.

Stamp duty revenue as % of GDP Australia — OECD average — UK 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 2005 2015 2000 2010 2020

Sources: ABS; OECD; UK Office for Budget Responsibility.



### **Our contributions**

Past studies from around the world disagree about the effects of stamp duty.

We revisit the effects with:

- A cleaner natural experiment, thanks to Australia's federation
- More comprehensive data, covering most outcome variables previously studied

Our results show:

- Stamp duty has large, permanent effects on purchase volumes and moves
- Stamp duty has little-to-no effect on prices
  - But changes in composition of transactions can look like price effects
- Results are consistent with model in Cho, Li and Uren (2024)

#### **Presentation structure**

- 1. The natural experiment and the data
- 2. Purchases and moves
- 3. Prices
- 4. Brief conclusion

# The natural experiment and the data

## Stamp duty changed suddenly in Queensland in FY 2012

- 14 June 2011: Qld government announced removal of large concession for owner occupier purchases
- 1 August 2011: Removal implemented
- 1 July 2012: Concession reinstated after change of government



- Investor buyers' stamp duty remained barely changed
- First-home buyers (FHB) remained exempt from stamp duty
- Non-FHB occupiers (50% of buyers) had tax rise of **1% of sale price** on average.
- Four control states did not change stamp duty in FYs 2008-13
  - NSW, Victoria, SA, WA



#### Data

#### Two source datasets (not linked)

- Purchase and price effects: commercial microdata on housing transactions
- Move effects: administrative microdata on people's locations and moves (at SA1 level)

#### **Purchase and moves volumes**

- Remove all purchases <\$350k, to exclude most first-home buyer (occupier) purchases
- Count purchase volumes within each:
  - SA3 (82 in Queensland, 218 in control states),
  - Financial year (FY) (July to June), and
  - Type (occupier or investor)
- Purchases outcome is occupier minus investor purchases per SA3-FY
- Also count moves by destination SA3 and FY
- Will use cross-state diff-in-diff with SA3-FY level observations



### Selecting control areas from the four control states

#### Challenge

- Coinciding strong influences on housing market (monetary policy, mining boom)
- Effects difficult to control for (e.g. role of mortgage debt)

#### Solution

- Match each Queensland SA3 to an SA3 from a control state
- Match on pre-treatment outcome trends
- Suited to unobserved confounders (e.g. synthetic controls)



## **Purchases and moves**

### **Regression method**

#### Standard differences in differences across SA3s and years

- 164 cross-section units (SA3s): 82 in Queensland, 82 in control
- 4 time periods: FYs 2009-2011 (pre-treatment) and 2012 (treatment)
- SA3 and FY fixed effects
- Purchases regression is essentially triple difference

#### **Robustness checks**

- Time-shifted placebo tests
- SA3-level synthetic controls (Robbins, Saunders and Kilmer, 2017)
- Space-shifted placebo tests (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010)



State-level outcomes for Queensland and matched control group Thousands



Notes: July 2011 is included in the FY 2012 points but excluded from the tax-rise shading, because the tax rise occured on 1 August 2011. Trend differences between purchases and moves can reflect moves by renters.



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### Results

Headline regression results with 95% confidence intervals Esimtated treatment effect in red; matched periods in black





### Purchase and moves takeaways and further results

- Treatment effects as % of FY 2011 levels, from a ~1ppt stamp duty rise:
  - Purchases: -13%
  - Moves: -10%.
- Permanent effect is most of this about -11% effect on purchases. Not far off some previous permanent effect estimates.
- Small temporary component in line with previous findings on buyer sophistication
- Heterogeneity analysis shows that:
  - Purchases of all types affected, across wealth, household size, urban/rural.
  - Short and long distance moves affected.



## **Prices**

### How to analyse price effects

- Can use a similar triple difference approach, but could have low power because
  - Prices are noisy
  - Average transacted prices are affected by changing composition of transactions
- **Instead, ask**: Where would treatment effects on prices be strongest?
- **Answer**: In dwellings that (untreated) investors are least willing to buy.
- **Approach** (similar to Prasad and Gillitzer, 2022):
  - Retain transaction-level sample
  - Stage 1: Give dwellings time-invariant rating of propensity to be purchased by an occupier
    'Occupier propensity'
  - Stage 2: Assess how prices of high occupier-propensity dwellings changed relative to others
    - Look for changes in relationship between log price and occupier propensity



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# Estimated relationships between price and occupier propensity Queensland, FY 2011-12 — FY 2011 600 550 Price (\$k) 500 450

Occupier propensity

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.5

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#### Estimated relationships between price and occupier propensity Queensland, FY 2011-12

- FY 2011 - FY 2012 counterfactual





#### Estimated relationships between price and occupier propensity Queensland, FY 2011-12

- FY 2011 - FY 2012 counterfactual - FY 2012 actual



#### **Price takeaways and other results**

- No evidence of a negative price effect
  - Noting that demand effects through FHB are switched off by the policy design
  - But results are similar to Cho et al. (2024) modelling that has FHB channel
- The composition of transacted housing did change.
  - Unsurprisingly, housing more exposed to the treatment was transacted less
- The raw data show a price decline that is driven by this compositional change
- Compositional changes may reconcile past literature differences
  - Besley, Meads and Surico (2014) control for composition and find no price effect
  - Best and Kleven (2018) do not, and find a strong price effect



# Conclusions

### Conclusions

- Stamp duty has strong negative permanent effect on purchases and moves
- Stamp duty has little effect on prices (at least when FHB channel switched off)
- Our natural experiment is cleaner and larger-scale than past studies
- We clear up some of the past differences in findings



### **Stamp duty across OECD countries**

#### Property tax revenue as a share of total tax revenues in 2020



Note: 2019 data for Australia, Greece, Japan, New Zealand and the OECD average. Data include taxes paid by households and non-households and include household and non-household real estate.

### **Does stamp duty affect net demand**



- No shift in demand curve
- Price effect  $\leq$  tax

- Downward shift in demand curve
- Price effect > tax

#### Stamp duty rates before and after





Notes: First-home buyer (FHB) discounts meant that the FHB tax for purchases under \$500k remained zero before and after the tax change.



### How much of the effect was temporary, due to anticipation of reversal?



Appendix

